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Introduction
This paper explores opportunities for China's regional trade agreement initiatives to be used to mitigate the impacts of anti-dumping (hereinafter referred to as AD) actions. Over the past few decades, China has become the world's largest economy targeted by AD actions with associated high AD duties. In examining China's experience of frictions in the international trading system as it has transitioned to full WTO membership, Bown（2007）argued that there was no evidence that foreign actions against China via AD had declined since its accession to WTO. Many scholars believe that it is the current structure of multilateral rules on AD under the WTO that allows widespread use of AD protection. Prusa (2005) proposed that the Doha Round may be the last chance to significantly reform AD rules. However, since the current principle of Consensus in WTO makes it almost difficult to gain unanimity among the member states that have divergent interests, it seems that the effective way to improve AD disciplines may lie at regional level.
The current limited research on regional AD regimes focuses more on either the divergence of regional AD regimes from the multilateral rules on the basis of their legal text (see as Jean- Daniel Rey,2012) , or on common characteristics of regional trade agreements (hereinafter referred to as RTAs) that could eliminate AD use within intra-RTA trade and their changing patterns of ADs (see as Robert The et al，2007； Ryan Farha，2013). Prusa（2011 and 2014) extend the scope of research on PTAs and discuss their AD usage trends, while Zimring (2014) uses a case study to analyze AD duty levels by US against non NAFTA countries with the implementation of NAFTA.
Both find evidence that PTAs shift the burden of trade restraints onto non-members.
However, existing research rarely deals with one country's initiative to modify AD regimes in its RTAs to improve the AD situation. Our motivation is to begin to fill this gap.
Our conclusions are as follows. Firstly, we note the high concentration of the share of AD actions taken by the top 4 and top 8 AD initiators against China, which implies that China should take the initiative by establishing RTAs with its major AD initiators. Secondly, we note China's treatment as a non-market economy by some top AD initiators and the large export growth from China contribute to China's adverse AD situations. Importantly, one party can offer a higher level of economic integration or openness in exchange for an improvement in regional AD provisions. In addition, the exploration of modified AD provisions in some RTAs as precedents can shed light on China's possible future regional initiatives, and findings of a weak effect of regional AD provisions in mitigating AD actions against China by RTA members supports the position that China should make efforts to ameliorate its regional AD provisions. Finally, the paper suggests that China's RTAs bargaining strategy should aim at obtaining market economy status from intensive AD initiators, and also altering regional AD provisions. The paper offers initial thoughts on potential packages of concessions to be offered in exchange for amelioration in regional AD treatment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes China's AD problems.
Section 3 explores reasons for the severity of AD actions against China. Section 4 examines the role of regional AD provisions in improving intra-RTA's AD situation.
We also comment on varied regional AD arrangements in force as initiatives and China's current regional AD provisions. Section 5 explores prospects for China's bargaining strategy to improve regional AD arrangements. Section 6 concludes.
The Severity of Anti-Dumping Actions against China
This section sets out details of AD activities targeting China, focusing on the size, intensity, duty levels, and concentration of main AD initiators.
a. Size
In Table 1 , we report the top 10 AD country targets, measured by the aggregated number of new initiations and measures during the period 1995-2013. China is the largest target economy for both AD initiations and AD measures. In terms of the share of the aggregate cases against China in the total cases worldwide, AD initiations against China contributed to 21.89% of total AD filings, while AD measures against China account for 24.78% of total measures during the period 1995-2013. Because of China's large and growing share of international trade and the growing size of its economy, it is perhaps not surprising to see it being named frequently in AD filings.
A first measure of AD intensity is "AD-export ratio", which is defined as an economy's share of AD cases in the world divided by its share of world exports. If an economy's AD-export ratio is above 1, it means that the economy is being targeted more than its share in exports (Chu & Prusa, 2004) . Table 2 reports comparisons of "AD export" ratios in the top 10 AD targeted economies. During the period 1995-2013, China ranks 5 th with a value of 2.71, a level much higher than that in the other 3 of top 4 large export economies with values less than 0.72 (including the U.S., Germany 2 and Japan). Such high 'AD export' ratio means that China is being named somewhat more intensively than other large export economies given its trade value, but this is less than some other developing countries (such as Indonesia ,Thailand and India).
2 In our calculation on the basis of WTO AD database, German is the 12 th target economy of AD investigation cases. During the period 1995-2013, the share of aggregated AD initiations in the world is 2.26%, the aggregate world export share is 8.93%, and the AD export intensity is 0.25. Table 3 reports on another dimension of AD intensity in the top 10 targeted economies in terms of affirmative ratios, defined as the number of measures divided by the number of initiations targeting a particular economy. During 1995 During -2013 .5% of all AD initiations against China received an affirmative final determination, which makes China the second highest affirmative ratio among the top 10 AD targeted economies. Chinese scholars have also made some insightful research on this area. Xiaohua
Bao（2011）argued that there exist considerable discretion and discrimination in AD measures against China taken by both developing countries and developed countries.
In all, there is widely accepted opinion among Chinese scholars that huge export growth and export surplus, China's non-market economy status, and also the low-price strategy of China's exporters contribute to a high incidence of AD cases against China with high AD duties.
a. Non-Market Economy Status （NME）
Where economies have non-market economy status, the WTO AD rules allow an investigating economy not to use the exporter's domestic prices in the determination of dumping, because a strict comparison with home market prices may not be appropriate. Importing countries have thus exercised significant discretion, by using the domestic price of other countries, in the calculation of normal value of products exported from non-market economies. Being classified as a non-market economy makes it difficult for exporting countries to defend themselves.
According to the accession protocol of China to WTO, China agreed to be treated as a non-market economy for another 15 years (which means that will expire in 2016). Because China is classified as non-market economy, investigators can assert that Chinese domestic prices fail to reflect the true cost of inputs as determined in the markets. Therefore, investigating countries need not recognize China's major comparative advantage in international trade resulting from the low labor cost, and can use the domestic input prices in other countries in determining the production cost of Chinese goods. Such practices greatly increase China's risk in dumping allegations.
Among 32 economies that have taken AD measures against China, there are now 22 countries that have already accorded market economy status to China. However, none of the top three AD initiators against China (India, US and EU) has acknowledged China's market economy status, and only 3 out of top 8 AD initiators have accorded market economy status to China. In Table 6 , we divide 32 countries into 2 groups. The higher average value of AD measures in group 1 partially implies that the group not having yet acknowledged
China's market economy status tends to take more AD measures than the group of countries that have already granted this status to China. Thus, NME status contributes to adverse AD treatment on China's exports. In Table 4 , among the top 5 countries with the highest average ADD, only Argentina has accorded market economy status to China, which equally suggests that NME status leads to high ADD levels against China. find that most of India's AD measures primarily target Chinese products due to the trade deficit caused by large growth in imports from China.
b. Large Export Growth from China
Moreover, in article 3 of determination of injury, WTO AD rules allow the investigating authorities to cumulatively assess the effects of such imports where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to AD investigations. The volume of dumped imports shall be regarded as significant under one of two conditions. One is that the volume of dumped imports from a country is found to account for no less than 3 percent of imports of the like product in the importing Member. And the alternative condition is that countries which individually account for less than 3 percent of the imports of the like product in the importing member collectively account for more than 7 per cent of imports of the like product in the importing Member. Therefore under WTO AD rules, China's import market share in a particular economy can easily exceed to the low threshold (Chu and Prusa 2004) , which likely leaded to high incidence of AD actions against China. As one of the few WTO-consistent instruments of protection, AD is part of "safeguards" without which tariff liberalization could not occur. Mastel (1998) argued that dumping is driven by closed home markets. Theoretically, the primary economic objective of RTAs is to eliminate barriers to intra-regional trade between members, and thus AD would finally be removed with deepening integration of RTAs. Hoekman (1998) argued that the impetus to eliminate AD remedies within RTAs is the broader push for economic integration and, relatedly, the desire to "extract concessions" from other parties to the agreement. Equally, Prusa (2014) argues that when countries can earn supernormal profits from the formation of RTAs, the barriers for intra-RTA trade will be eliminated for they no longer need to protect their home markets, and the AD use will be limited or even prohibited. Current research, focusing on the common characteristics of RTAs eliminating the AD use within intra-RTA trade (see Robert
The et al, 2007; Jean- Daniel Rey, 2012; Ryan Farha, 2013) , also argues that the leading candidate to explain the abolition of AD is the depth of market integration envisioned in the RTA.
Though little research exists on the common characteristics of RTAs that restrict the use of AD, in discussing the bargaining strategy of NAFTA in which introduction of binational review is stipulated in the regional AD regime, Whalley (1996) pointed out that some degree of exemption from the use of AD sought by Canada were secured by implicit side payments in the form of domestic policy disciplines favorable to United States. Such side payments can be considered as the price which makes USA willing to make some concession in the use of AD protection as a pay back.
Consequently, during RTAs' negotiation, one party can offer a bid with a high level of economic integration and economic openness in exchange for an improvement in regional AD arrangements.
Not only can it be paid by provisions which eliminate or restrict the use of AD within RTAs, the supernormal profit benefiting from the integration or openness can even sometimes devalue the role of AD. For example, when deeper integration lies in the harmonization of institution and policies, the value of AD in protecting unfair trade resulting from the differences in competition conditions and international segmentation of markets will decrease.
b Overall distribution of AD provisions in current RTAs
On the basis of classification criteria developed by Jean-Daniel Rey (2012) in his WTO working report, three varieties of regional AD regimes in RTAs can be developed. In category A, RTAs simply confirm or make reference to rights and obligations in WTO's agreement on AD. The category B explicitly eliminates the use of AD measures against intra-RTA exports, and Category C contains specific restrictive provisions which limit the use of AD against RTA's partners. By comparing 253 RTAs' data notified to the WTO by 10/2014 with data ending in 10/2010 in the WTO working paper by Jean-Daniel Rey（2012）, Table 8 demonstrates some characteristics of the regional AD regimes favored by RTAs. which partners have rarely used AD measures against each other (Ryan Farha, 2007 ).
This suggests a low possibility for China to achieve the prohibition of AD within intra-RTA trade.
More importantly, Table 8 All of these elements reduce the administration discretion and make it more difficult to initiate or take AD measures. Therefore, it is believed that Category C will be one feasible way for a country to mitigate its AD problems.
c. Case studies as precedents for China's FTAs and AD
To further discuss the role of economic integration in altering regional AD regimes and also the effects of such alterations, we report on case studies of the EU, US and India, the top 3 AD initiators against China. In Table 9 , there are a total of 10 RTAs that have modified traditional WTO AD rules. All the partners in these 10 RTAs had at least once suffered from the AD investigation initiated by EU, US or India before the signature of RTAs. Fortunately, through the restrictive regional AD regimes, their AD situation seems to be improved with the declining trend of their annual average AD initiations following the implementation of RTAs (as in the US's RTAs and India's RTAs) or with no initiation of AD investigation in EU's newly RTAs. Table 9 also shows that all of these 10 RTAs, altering AD provisions, belong to the type of EIA (economic integration agreement), which is consistent with the prospect of economic development and integration through RTA's partnership.
What can these benefits from economic development and integration be? In that prohibit zeroing could lower the margin of dumping, and thus, an AD investigation against RTA members will become more possible to be terminated.
Moreover, in EU-South Korea and South Korea-US RTAs, one article specifies that for any AD measures on goods originating in the other party that have been terminated in the previous 12 months as a result of a review, the investigation shall not proceed, unless this preinitiation examination of the application for the AD initiation indicates that the circumstances have changed. This provision could thus reduce the likelihood of AD initiation.
Second, there are rules that decrease the AD duties level. This is often referred to as a lesser duty rule. In WTO AD rules, it is desirable that the AD duty be less than the margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry, which suggests that a lesser duty rule is only encouraged. However, India-Malaysia and South Korea-US RTAs mandate the lesser duty rule in the application of an AD duty. Such a mandate in a RTA can provide a significant advantage to members, because in the event that an AD action is taken against RTA's partners and non-partners, a lower AD duty will be imposed on the RTA partners even though the AD investigation might have found the same dumping margin against all suppliers (see as Prusa (2014) (2012)). However, since these studies focus only on the number of AD investigations by RTAs' contracting members, this research fails to consider the role of the large share of imports from China resulting from intra-RTA trade creation effects in the rising AD appeal actions. We use the AD measure, AD intensity and ADD to reexamine the effects of RTAs on mitigating the severity of China's AD problems. Because of the difference in the year of entry into force for each RTAs, the year of entry into force of RTAs is defined as t, one year prior to the entry into force is set as t − 1, two years before the entry into force is set as t − 2, three years before the entry into force of RTAs is set as t − 3, one year after the entry into force of RTAs is set as t + 1, two years after is set as t + 2,and so on. Table12 As shown in Table 12 , among the 7 countries except New Zealand, simply confirming the WTO's AD agreements without any modification in ASEAN-China, APTA and China-Pakistan RTA, there seems no declining tendency of AD measures taken against China. By contrast, New Zealand, with some enhancement of transparency in the regional AD regimes with China, has seldom taken AD measures against China since the implementation of RTAs, which suggests the importance of enhanced transparency in mitigating regional AD problems. We have also calculated an annual AD intensity index based on the method used by Chu and Prusa (2004) 7 . The calculation method is as follows:
Table13 Changing pattern of Annual AD intensity index with implementation of RTAs
AD intensity index = the proportion of number of AD measures against China by the total number of AD initiations against World in one year the share of Chinese ′ s products in initiator country ′ s import markets in one year
As shown in Table 13 , even after the implementation of RTAs, AD intensity indices in 4 out of 6 countries with regional AD regimes of Category A are usually above 1, which means that their AD measures against China are disproportionately severe compared with the increased share of China's import resulting from the trade creation effects of RTAs. Such a high level of AD intensity after the implementation of RTAs may be due to the fact that these RTAs simply confirm WTO AD rules.
In Table 14 , we make comparisons of country ADD levels worldwide and against
China between pre and post the implementation of RTAs. The 6 countries with the exception to India in Table 14 have acknowledged China's market economy status since 2004.We find that ADD levels imposed on China's export by the 5 countries have become higher than their ADD levels worldwide since the implementation of RTAs, and the only exception is Malaysia. And also the average annual AD initiations against China after the implementation of RTAs are larger than those prior to the implementation in all the 6 countries. These data underscores the argument that as China fails to take the initiative of modifying regional AD regimes in its RTAs, there seems only a weak effect of regional AD provisions in mitigating China's AD problems. Wang, 2009) , it is believed that the "protection diversion" effects of RTAs (see as Bhagwati, 1993; Bown, 2007) exist in RTAs with China's AD initiators as parties. Therefore, if China has been excluded from the RTAs with the top initiators as parties to them, China's AD problems will further intensify. China could thus take the initiative to establish RTAs with its major AD initiators.
Our earlier analysis on the role of RTAs in lessening AD problems emphasizes the concessions that might be expected to pay as a price from one partner for addressing the amelioration of AD matters. Consequently, China should make concessions and put forward an attractive bid package in exchange for better AD treatment. In relieving AD problems, China should first attempt to obtain the market economy status, accorded by intensive AD countries including India, US and EU, through regional or bilateral negotiation. Though China's non-market economy status agreed to in its WTO accession negotiation is set to expire in 2015, other possibilities exist for proposals in RTA negotiation, since we found that there seems only a weak effect of current regional AD provisions in mitigating China's AD situations.
Therefore, in the long run, China could, by the establishment of new RTAs with intensive AD users such as U.S., EU，India, Argentina and Brazil, or upgrading of existing RTAs, offer attractive terms to exchange for AD provisions with higher transparency and low discretion in RTA negotiation.
When it comes to negotiation with developed countries, U.S. and EU, which rank among the top 3 of AD initiators against China, need to receive considerable attention.
China has a strong interest in using negotiation with the U.S. and EU to improve AD matters. Modification in the regional AD provisions could be de-minimis standard applicable to review, lesser duty rule as a mandate, the prohibition of zeroing and 
Concluding Remarks
We highlight the severity of China's AD problems: the largest target economy in terms of both AD initiations and AD measures, high AD intensity, and very high AD duty level. We note much higher concentration in the AD actions taken by top 4 and top 8 AD initiators against China than those by top AD initiators worldwide, while
China has only one out of top 8 initiators as RTA's partners. Because of the "protection diversion" of RTAs, We suggest that China could thus take the initiative to establish RTAs with its major AD initiators, in part as a way of offsetting the impacts of such duties.
Current research deals little with how RTAs can succeed in mitigating AD problems at the intra-RTA level. By synthesizing the literature on objectives of AD and that of RTAs, we argue that during RTA negotiations, one party can offer a bid with higher level of economic integration and economic openness in exchange for a kind of improvement in regional AD matters. Among the two regional AD provisions aiming at mitigating AD protection at the intra-RTA level, we suggest that for China, regional provisions restricting AD protection are more feasible than those prohibiting the AD use.
We differ from studies on PTAs and AD by Prusa (2014) and Zimring (2014) who focus on the case of NAFTA, by making case studies on RTAs involving EU, US
and India, and focus on the features of their regional AD provisions, and also their AD usage patterns prior to and after the implementation of RTAs. Our results support the argument that the impetus of economic integration can alter AD provisions in their
RTAs and also the effect of such alterations can motivate China's regional approach to mitigating AD problems.
We also discuss the effects of existing RTAs on mitigating China's AD problems.
Since any substantial modifications have yet to be made in the regional AD regimes concluded by China with foreign countries, there seems to be a weak role for current RTAs in mitigating China's AD problems. Therefore, China could become more active in mitigating AD problems by directly seeking alterations in regional AD provisions.
We conclude by outlining a possible China bargaining strategy to mitigate the AD situation in RTAs. China could first to obtain market economy status, accorded by intensive AD countries including India, the U.S. and EU. At the same time, China could, by the establishment of new RTAs with intensive AD users or upgrading of existing RTAs, offer attractive bids to exchange for AD provisions with higher transparency and low discretion. We set out some examples of bid packages.
